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DeWitt: Employment Discrimination

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION
GOTTHARDT v. NATIONAL RAILROAD
PASSENGER CORP.
191 F.3D 1148 (9TH CIR. 1999)

I. INTRODUCTION

In Gotthardt v. National Railroad Passenger Corp.: the
United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that
front pay awards 2 in Title VII cases are not subject to the compensatory damages caps stated in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a (b)(3).3
This was an issue of first impression in the Ninth Circuit.4
6
Other circuits had decided the issue and were split. The
Ninth Circuit joined the majority of the federal circuits in

1

Gotthardt v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 191 F.3d 1148 (9th Cir. 1999).

2

Front pay is the monetary equivalent of reinstatement. It represents what the
plaintiff would have earned between the date of the award and at some point in the
future. As was true for Meriola, it is sometimes appropriate to grant front pay until
the plaintitl's retirement. 5 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 2d § 92.12 (Matthew
Bender 1999)
3

•

See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1155. 42 U.S.C.A § 1981a(b)(3) states, m relevant part,
that "[t]he sum of the amount of compensatory damages awarded under this section
for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain, suffering. inconvenience. mental anguish,
loss of enjoyment of life, and other nonpecuniary losses, and the amount of punitive
damages awarded under this section, shall not exceed, for each complaining party ...
[$300,000 in the case of a respondent who has more than 500 employees in each of 20
or more calendar weeks in the current or preceding calendar year.]
4
See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1151.
6

See id. at 1153 (citing Hudson v. Reno, 130 F.3d 1193, 1202-1204 (6th Cir. 1997)
(stating that front pay awards do fall within the caps); Martini v. Federal Nat1 Mortgage Ass'n, 178 F.3d 1336, 1348-1349 (D.C. Cir. 1999), Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc.,
164 F.3d 545, 555 (lOth Cir. 1999), Kramer v. Logan County Sch. Dist. No. R-l, 157
F.3d 620, 626 (8th Cir. 1998) (stating that front pay awards fall outside the caps).

192
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holding that front pay awards are not subject to the section
1981a caps.6

II.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Meriohi Z. Gotthardt ("Meriola") began working for the National Railroad Passenger Corporation, dba Amtrak ("Amtrak"), in 1988. 7 She was an assistant engineer, working as a
"fireman" [sic] on Amtrak's trains. 8 In 1990 and 1991, Meriola
attempted to qualify for engineering positions on the Oakland
to Santa Barbara Route. 9 Amtrak requires its engineers to
qualify for each route they cover.lO Qualifying for a particular
route consists of passing an oral examination and actually performing the route with a supervisor present. 11 This "checkride"
allows the applicant to demonstrate his or her skill in handling
12
the train and negotiating the route.
Meriola attempted to
13
qualify for the Oakland to Santa Barbara Route fifteen times.
As a result, she was removed from service in July, 1991 because she was unable to operate the train in a safe manner.14
However, Meriola eventually qualified for the route in October,
1991. 15 During two of her attempts to qualify for the route,

6

See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1154.

7

See Gotthardt v. National Railroad Passenger Corp., 191 F.3d 1148, 1151 (9th Cir.
1999).
8

9

See id.
.

See ,d. at 1151, 1158.

10
11

See id. at 115l.
See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 115l.

12 ~d .
13
See id. at 1158.
14

See id. Observers stated that Meriola did not operate the train in a safe manner.

1d. at 1159.

15

See id. at 1158.
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Meriola endured
16
h arassment.

hostile

work

environment

sexual

In 1993, Meriola took a position as an "overnight shift yard
engineer. "17 She took this position, in part, because she was
1S
sus}:~nded due to a rules violation while operating a train.
During her tenure as an overnight shift yard engineer,
Meriola's supervisors called her degrading names and engaged
19
in other harassing behavior while at work. Based on the harassment she endured during this period, Meriola sued Amtrak
on September 13, 1993, alleging Title VII violations ("Gotthardt F').20 Meriola asserted that she had been discriminated
against because of her sex, subjected to hostile work environment sexual harassment,21 retaliated againse2 and falsely im.
d .23
pnsone

16 See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1158. The opinion does not describe the conduct that
created the hostile work environment.

17

See id. at 1151. The opinion does not indicate whether this position was a demotion; nor does it describe Meriola's duties while she held this position.
1S See id. at 1158, 1159.
19

See id. at 1151. The opinion does not describe the "other harassing behavior"
that Meriola endured.
20 See id. at 1152. Title VII states that "lilt shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer to (1) fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex or national origin; or (2) to limit, segregate or classifY his employees or applicants for employment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42
U.S.C.A § 2000e-2(a).
21 See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1152. The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission defines hostile environment sexual harassment as conduct which "has the purpose or effect of unreasonably interfering with an individual's work performance or
creating an intimidating, hostile, or offensive working environment." Guidelines on
Discrimination Because of Sex, 29 CFR § 1604.11(a)(3). Such conduct must be "severe
or pervasive" to constitute actionable sexual harassment under Title VII. See Harris
v. Forklift Systems, Inc., 510 U.S. 17,21-22 (1993).
22 See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1152. The following elements constitute a prima facie
case of retaliation under Title VII: (1) plaintiff engaged in protected activity under
Title VII (e.g., filing a complaint with the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission) (2) the employer made an employment decision adverse to the plaintiff, and (3)
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Amtrak eliminated Meriola's overnight shift yard engineer
24
position in April 1995. Consequently, Meriola applied for an
engineer position on the "Capitol Run," a route which travels
through Oakland, San Jose and Sacramento. 25
She was
trained for this route and scheduled a checkride to demonstrate her skill on the route in the presence of a supervisor. 26
Unfortunately, Meriola never completed the qualification process for the Capitol Run. 27 She took a medical leave beginning
May 5, 1995 and never returned to work. 28 Meriola's treating
psychologist, Dr. Jeanne Rivoire, later attributed this illness to
Post Traumatic Stress Disorder ("PTSD"), which was caused by
29
the harassment Meriola endured while working for Amtrak.
Soon after leaving Amtrak, Meriola filed a second action on
July 5, 1995 alleging similar Title VII violations ("Gotthardt
11").30 The United States District Court for the Northern Dis31
trict of California consolidated Meriola's actions.

plaintiff must demonstrate a causal link between the protected activity and the employer's action. See Anderson v. Reno, 190 F.3d 930, 938 (9th Cir. 1999) (citing
Yartzoffv. Thomas, 809 F.2d 1371, 1375 (9th Cir. 1987».
23

See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1152. False Imprisonment is a common law tort. The
plaintiff must prove that defendant restrained him, either by physical barriers or
threats of force. Plaintiff must be aware of such a restraint and that such restraint
was against his will. See W. PAGE KEETON, ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAw
OF TORTS § 11, at 47-54 (5th ed. 1984).
24 See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1151-1152. The opinion does not indicate whether
Amtrak gave a reason for eliminating Meriola's overnight shift yard engineer position.
25

26

27
28

Id. at 1152.

See id.
S ee id.
See id. at 1152, 1155.

29

See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1152, 1155-1156. Dr. Rivoire was also Meriola's expert at trial. Id.
30 See id. at 1152. The opinion does not specifically describe any other events that
gave rise to Gotthardt II,. although there were indications that Meriola's medical leave
was involuntary. Id. at 1156.
31
See id.
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The district court dismissed the false imprisonment and
retaliation claims in Gotthardt 1.32 Furthermore, the court
found that Meriola failed to prove employment discrimination
33
based on sex.
She had, however, proved that Amtrak was
liable for hostile work environment sexual harassment. 34
Nevertheless, the court did not award damages on the hostile
environment claim because Meriola "failed to present testimony regarding the extent of her damages.,,35 Meriola ap36
pealed this denial of backpay to the Ninth Circuit.

Gotthardt II was tried to a jury.37 The jury returned a verdict in Meriola's favor on the hostile work environment claim
38
and awarded her $350,000 in compensatory damages. However, the jury found against her on the retaliation and sex39
based discrimination claims.
The district court adopted the
verdict, but reduced the damages award to $300,000 pursuant
to 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3), which caps compensatory damages
in Title VII cases. 40
41
Next, the district court calculated equitable relief.
The
court made three crucial findings after an evidentiary
42
hearing. First, the court concluded that Meriola's PTSD prevented her from returning to work at Amtrak. 43 Second, given

32See

id .

33
See id.
34

See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1152.

35

36

See I'd •

See id.

nSee I'd • Gotthardt I was not decided by a jury because the claims in t hat action
arose before Congress amended Title VII 1991, which provided for jury trials in Title
VII cases. Id. at n. 3.

38 See Id.
.
39

See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1152.

40

See id. See also, supra, note 3.

41
See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1152.
42 See Id.
.
43

See id. Dr. Rivoire's testimony indicated that Meriola's stressed condition presented her from working altogether. See id. at 1156. Moreover, it is often the case
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Meriola's age and background, the court found that she would
44
be unable to begin another career. Third, the court determined that, but for the PTSD, Meriola would have qualified for
the Capitol Run route, which she had applied for before she fell
ill.45 Further, the court assumed that Meriola would have remained on the Capitol Run route until she retired. 46 Based on
the findings described above, the court awarded $124,010.46 in
back pay.47 The court also awarded front pay in the amount of
$603,928.37. 48 Amtrak did not appeal the findings of
liability.49 Rather, Amtrak appealed the remedies fashioned by
the district court. 50 Meriola appealed the denial of back pay in
Gotthardt 1.51
III. THE NINTH CIRCUIT'S ANALYSIS

As stated in Part I, the primary issue on appeal was
whether the damages caps specified in 42 U.S.C. § 1981a(b)(3)

that hostility between the parties makes reinstatement inappropriate, either because
of the litigation, or because of the hostilities that existed prior to the litigation. See 5
EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 2d § 92.12 (Matthew Bender 1999).

44 See Gotthardt,

award.

.

191 F.3d at 1152. Meriola was 59 years old at the time of the

rd.

.
See id. The court based this assumption on several facts. First, she was sufficiently skilled and experienced to handle the route. Second, the route was less difficult than other Amtrak routes. Third, although she had missed work on some occasions, there was no evidence that these absences were habitual or would be a problem
in the future. All of these facts were appropriate considerations in calculating front
pay. See id. at 1157.
~

46
See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1152-1153
47 See id. This amount represented the pay she would have received from the date

of qualification for the Capitol Run to the date the court issued its findings, minus the
disability benefits she had already received, plus prejudgment interest. See id.
48 See id. at 1152. This amount represented the pay and benefits Meriola would
have received if she had worked as an engineer on the Capitol Run from the date of
the court's decision until she reached Amtrak's mandatory retirement age of 70 years
old, discounted to the present cash value. See id.

49
See id. at 1153.
50 See I'd •
61

See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1153.
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apply to front pay awards. 52 The district court concluded that
53
section 1981a(b)(3) does not cap front pay awards. The Ninth
Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 54
The Ninth Circuit also determined whether front pay was
appropriate. 55 The court found that the district court did not
56
err in awarding and calculating front pay as it did. Finally,
the Ninth Circuit addressed Meriola's argument that the district court erred in denying back pay in Gotthardt 1.57 Again,
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. 58
A. WHETHER FRONT PAY IS SUBJECT TO THE 42 U.S.C.A § 1981A
CAPS

The Ninth Circuit focused on the relationship between sections 1981a, and 2000e-5(g).59 Section 1981a was enacted in
1991 and authorized compensatory and punitive damages in
Title VII cases. 60 However, section 1981a(b)(3) also caps the
61
amount of damages, depending on the size of the employer.
62
In Meriola's case, such damages are capped at $300,000. The
Ninth Circuit noted that, in addition to the damages described

52 See Gotthardt v. National Railroad Passenger Corp. 191 F.3d 1148. 1153 (9th Cir.
1999).
53
See id.
54
See id. at 1151. 1159.
55
56

57
58

See id. at 1155.
S ee,·d .

See Gotthardt. 191 F.3d at 1158.
S ee,·d . at 1158. 1159.

59 See id. at 1153. 42 U.S.C.A § 2000e-5(g) states. in relevant part: "If the court
finds that the respondent has intentionally engaged in ... an unlawful employment
practice •... the court may enjoin the respondent ... and order ... reinstatement... with or
without back pay ... or any other equitable relief as the court deems appropriate."

60 See Gotthardt. 191 F.3d at 1153. Prior to 1991. Title VII plaintiffs could not recover these types of damages. See id.
61

See 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a(b)(3).

62 See Gotthardt. 191 F.3d at 1153 (quoting 42 U.S.C.A. § 1981a(bX3». Because
Amtrak has more than 300 employees. section 1981a(b)(3) caps damages at $300.000.
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above, Title VII itself has always authorized courts to grant
equitable relief to successful plaintiffs. 63 Further, it is important to recognize that when section 1981a was enacted, Congress left these provisions intact. 54
With the foregoing principles in mind, the Ninth Circuit
stated that whether front pay is subject to the caps depends on
whether the award is a future pecuniary loss as described in
section 1981a(b)(3) or equitable relief authorized under section
2000e-5(g).65 The circuit split arises here. 66 For example, in
Hudson v. Reno,67t he Sixth Circuit held that front pay falls
within the cap because front pay is not specifically stated as a
type of authorized equitable relief in section 2000e-5(g).68 The
Hudson court noted that Sixth Circuit precedents have consistently treated front pay as a legal, rather than equitable, remedy.69 Furthermore, the Sixth Circuit stated in Hudson that
the future pecuniary loss described in § 1981a(b)(3) could only
be front pay.70 In contrast to the Sixth Circuit's approach, the
majority of circuits have held that front pay is an equitable
remedy within the meaning of § 2000e-5(g) and is therefore
excluded from the caps by the very language of section1981a. 71

63 See id.
54

•

See ,d.
65
See id.
66

See id. See infra note8 67-71 for citations to cases illustrating the circuit split.

67 130 F.3d l193 (6th Cir.

1997) (cited in Gotthardt v. National Railroad, 191 F.3d
l148, l153-l154 (9th Cir. 1999».
68

69

See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at l153-l154.

See Hudson, 130 F.3d at 1203 (cited in Gotthardt v. National Railroad, 191 F. 3d
l148, l153-l154 (9th Cir. 1999».
70 See id. at 1204 (cited in Gotthardt v. National Railroad, 191 F.3d l148, l154 (9th
Cir.1999).

71 See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at l154 (citing Martini v. Federal Nat'l Mortgage Ass'n,
178 F.3d 1336, 1348-1349 (D.C. Cir. 1999); Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d
545, 555 (lOth Cir. 1999), pet. for cert. filed, 67 U.S.L.W. 3717 (U.S. May 12, 1999) (No.
98-1829); Kramer v. Logan County Sch. Dist. No. R-1, 157 F.3d 620, 626 (8th Cir.
1998».
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The Ninth Circuit examined the language and intent of sec72
tion 1981a.
The court stated that Congress included language in section 1981a that evinced an intent to leave the
73
courts' existing equitable powers intact. Moreover, the Ninth
Circuit noted that, before section 1981a was enacted, courts
had treated front pay as an equitable remedy under section
2000e-5(g).74 This remedy was used to make plaintiffs whole
when reinstatement was impractical. 75 Since Congress is presumed "to have had knowledge of the interpretation given to
the incorporated law," the Ninth Circuit stated that Congress
understood front pay to be one of the existing equitable remedies and therefore not within the cap imposed by section
1981a(b)(3).76
The cc.;rt also quoted portions of the Congressional Record
which indicated that the d~,~},fters of section 1981a recognized
that front pay was an existing equitable remedy not subject to
the section 1981a caps.77 In addition, the Ninth Circuit found
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission's ("EEOC")
7s
view of this issue persuasive. The EEOC stated that front
pay is one of the types of equitable relief contemplated in section 2000e-5(g) and is therefore not a type of compensatory

72
See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1154.
73

See id (citing 42 U.S.C.A § 1981a(a)(I), (b)(2». Section 1981a(a)(1) states, in
relevant part, that "the complaining party may recover compensatory and punitive
damages as allowed in subsection (b) of this section, in addition to any relief authorized by section [2000e-5(g)] of the Civil Rights Act of 1964... " (emphasis added). Section 1981a(b)(2) states, in relevant part, that "[c]ompensatory damages awarded under
this section shall not include backpay, interest on backpay, or any other type of relief
authorized under section [2000e-51 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." (emphasis added).
74 See I'd •
75

S ee id .

76

See I'd •

77

See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1154.

7S

See id at 1154 n.6 (citing EEOC: Policy Guidance on Compensatory and Punitive
Damages under 1991 Civil Rights Act, 8 Lab. ReI. Rep. Fair Empl. Prac. Manual
(BNA) 405:7091,7094 (July 7, 1992».
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damages subject to the section 1981a caps.79 The Ninth Circuit
stated that, since the EEOC is charged with interpreting Title
VII, it was appropriate for the court to defer to the agency's
. t erpret a t'Ion. 80
In
Based on the analysis described above, the Ninth Circuit
concluded that front pay was not subject to the section 1981a
caps.81 The court then discussed the district court's calculation
82
of Meriola's front pay award.
B. WHETHER MERIOLA'S FRONT PAY AWARD WAS APPROPRIATE

The Ninth Circuit's discussion centered on two determinations: first, the preliminary question of whether awarding front
pay was appropriate; and second, the actual calculation of the
83
award.
Before front pay is available, a Title VII plaintiff must
prove that the employer's unlawful practices caused a loss of
84
employment. Stated another way, this causal connection requires a plaintiff to show that he or she was forced to leave the
job because of discriminatory working conditions. 85 The district court concluded that there was a nexus between Meriola's
86
intolerable working conditions and her loss of employment.
The district court based its finding primarily on the testimony

79

See id (citing EEOC: Policy Guidance on Compensatory and Punitive Damages
under 1991 Civil Rights Act, 8 Lab. ReI. Rep. Fair Empl. Prac. Manual (BNA)
405:7091, 7094 (July 7, 1992».

80 See id (citing Wilderness Soc'y v. Dombeck, 168 F.3d 367, 370 (9th Cir. 1999».
81
See id. at 1155.
82
See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1155.

S3

.

See ,d. at 1155, 1156.
S4 See id.

85
See id.
86 See id.

Specifically, the district court found, and the Ninth Circuit agreed, that
Amtrak's hostile work environment caused Meriola's PTSD, which forced her to take a
medical leave and eventually resign. There was some indication that Amtrak forced
Gotthardt to take the medical leave. See id.
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of Meriola's psychologist, Dr. Rivoire. 87 Dr. Rivoire testified
that the hostile working environment at Amtrak caused
Meriola's prrSD, which in turn caused Meriola to resign.88 In
reviewing for clear error, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court's determination was plausible and therefore de89
clined to disturb the ruling.
Amtrak argued on appeal that the district court should
have ordered reinstatement rather than front pay.90 While it is
true that reinstatement is the preferred remedy, front pay is
91
an appropriate award when reinstatement is impossible.
Amtrak argued that reinstatement was appropriate because it
could offer Meriola several positions in a non-hostile work en.
t 92
Vlronmen.
However, the district court concluded that Meriola's medical and psychological condition made returning to Amtrak im93
possible.
Furthermore, Meriola's circumstances prevented
her from entering another career. 94 Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discre. 95
t Ion.

87 See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1156 & n.9
88
89

See id. at 1156.
S ee id .

90 See,'d .
91
92

See id .
See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1156.

93 See id. Dr. Rivoire'8 testimony indicated that Meriola's stressed condition presented her from working altogether. See id. Moreover, it is often the case that hostility between the parties makes reinstatement inappropriate, either because of the
litigation, or because of the hostilities that existed prior to the litigation. See LARsON,
5 EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION 2d § 92.12 (1999).
94 See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1156. Meriola's medical and psychological condition,
age, and background indicated that returning to Amtrak, or working anywhere else,
would be impossible. See id. at 1152, 1156.
95 ee,'d .
S

Published by GGU Law Digital Commons, 2000

11

Golden Gate University Law Review, Vol. 30, Iss. 1 [2000], Art. 11

2000]

EMPLOYMENT DISCRIMINATION

203

Amtrak next argued that the district court's front pay cal96
culation was incorrect. Specifically, Amtrak asserted that the
court abused its discretion by determining that Meriola would
have qualified for the Capitol Run and worked steadily on that
97
route until she retired. Amtrak further argued that the district court failed to account for Meriola's duty to mitigate her
damages and the effect of disability payments in the future. 98
The Ninth Circuit addressed Amtrak's arguments in turn. 99
As to Meriola's projected career path, the Ninth Circuit stated
that the calculation was only appropriate if Meriola would
have qualified for the Capitol Run absent the hostile working
environment at Amtrak. 100 The Ninth Circuit concluded that
Meriola possessed the skills and ability to qualify for the Capitol Run. lOl
The Ninth Circuit also rejected Amtrak's contention that
Meriola's award should have accounted for her duty to mitigate
l02
her damages.
Specifically, the court stated that, since her
PTSD rendered her unable to work at any job, she could not be
charged with a duty to find work in order to mitigate her damages. l03 Finally, the Ninth Circuit turned to Amtrak's assertion that future disability benefits that Meriola might receive
104
should be deducted from her award.
The court rejected Amtrak's argument because Amtrak could only speculate as to
whether Meriola would be entitled to these benefits in the fu96
97

See id.
See id.

9S

See id. Specifically, Amtrak argued that future disability payments should have
been deducted from Meriola's award. See id.
99

See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1156-1158.

100

See id. at 1156.

101 See id. at 1157. Amtrak supervisors reported that Meriola was "a highly capable engineer." Evidence also indicated that the Capitol Run was less difficult than
other routes. These facts were sufficient to support the finding that Meriola would
have qualified for the Capitol Run. [d.
102
103
104

See id.
See id.
See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1157-1158.
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l05

ture. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit concluded that front pay
was appropriate in Meriola's case and that the district court
did not err in its calculation of the award. lOS
C. WHETHER THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED IN DENYING
MERIOLA'S BACK PAY

Meriola appealed the district court's denial of back pay in
Gotthardt 1. 107 Meriola asserted that denying her back pay was
clearly erroneous because she presented evidence that she lost
168 days of work. lOS Amtrak conceded that she had lost 168
days of work. 109 However, the district court found that Meriola
did not prove that her absences were due to Amtrak's unlawful
conduct. 110
The Ninth Circuit stated that the burden of proving damages is on the plaintiff. III Accordingly, Meriola had to prove,
not simply that she missed work, but that her absences were
due to Amtrak's discrimination. 112 Meriola's missed work arose
from her removal from service after she could not qualify for
the Oakland-Santa Barbara Route and a disciplinary suspen-

105

See id. at 1158. Interestingly, there is also a circuit split on whether collateral
benefits, such as disability, should be taken into account when calculating front pay.
See id (citing Lussier v. Runyon, 50 F.3d 1103, 1107-1108 (1st Cir. 1995) (holding that
courts should deduct such benefits from front pay awards) and Hamlin v. Charter
Township of Flint, 165 F.3d 426, 433 (6th Cir. 1999) (holding that courts are prohibited
from deducting collateral benefits from front pay». The Ninth Circuit did not have to
decide this issue here because Amtrak's assertion that Meriola would be entitled to
disability benefits was speculative. See id.
106

See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1158.

107 See id. Back pay is the difference between what the plaintiff actually earned
and what the plaintiff would have earned in the absence of defendant's discrimination.
See id.
lOS

109
110

III
112

See id.
See id.
See id.
See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1158.
See id.
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sion of 56 days for a rule violation. 113 She did not prove that
these instances were the result of Amtrak's discrimination. 114
As to Meriola's removal, Amtrak had a legitimate nondiscriminatory reason for removing Meriola from service: she was unable to handle the route safely.1l5 Thus, it was her lack of skill
on the route, not discrimination, that resulted in her missed
work. 116 As to the 56 day suspension, Meriola alleged that the
usual suspension for similar violations was 30 days. 117 However, the district court found that the difference in treatment
was not discriminatory because other engineers had received
118
similar suspensions for the same violations. Thus, because
Meriola could not prove her damages, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of back pay in Gotthardt 1. 119
IV. IMPLICATIONS OF THE DECISION

The Ninth Circuit wisely joined the majority of circuit
courts in holding that the section 1981a caps do not apply to
front pay awards. Because the United States Supreme Court
recently denied a petition for certiorari on this issue,120 the
split in the circuits remains. The Court should therefore grant
certiorari on the next available opportunity to definitively determine whether front pay awards are subject to the section
1981a caps. Until such a resolution occurs, the calculation of
front pay will continue to depend on where a Title VII plaintiff
happens to suffer discrimination. It is not likely that the
drafters of section 1981a intended this result.

113
114
115
116
117
118

119

See id ..

See id.
See id. at 1158-1159.

See Gotthardt, 191 F.3d at 1158-1159.
See id. at 1159.
See id.
S ee id .

120 See Medlock v. Ortho Biotech, Inc., 164 F.3d 545, 555 (lOth Cir. 1999), pet. for
cert. denied, 120 S.Ct. 48 (l999).
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In resolving the circuit split, the Court should follow the
reasoning of the Ninth Circuit and majority.121 While the Sixth
Circuit's statement that a future pecuniary loss could only be
front pay122 is a plausible reason to include front pay in the
caps, the Ninth Circuit persuasively concluded that plain language and legislative history of section 1981a indicate that
front pay awards are excluded from the caps. 123 In addition,
the Court should defer to the EEOC's determination that front
pay is not subject to the section 1981a caps.124
Jennifer T. De Witt·

121 See supra notes 59-82 and accompanying text.
122
See supra notes 67-70 and accompanying text.
123 See supra notes 59-82 and accompanying text.
124 See Gotthardt at 1154 n.6 (citing EEOC: Policy Guidance on Compensatory and
Punitive Damages under 1991 Civil Rights Act, 8 Lab. ReI. Rep. Fair Empl. Prac.
Manual (BNA) 405:7091,7094 (July 7,1992) .
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